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I. Introduction  
We are involved in research exploring the wholesale authority of bankruptcy 
courts to supplement the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. By supplement, we 
mean to make decisions or take actions that are not provided for in applicable, 
specific statutes. Such a decision or action is "supplemental law."  
Our use of the phrase "supplemental law" and our research does not include either 
artful interpretation or exercises of discretion that a particular statute allows. We 
only consider the court's authority to decide or act beyond, or different from, 
statutory provisions on the basis of general authority apart from the provisions 
themselves.  
Our principal focus is Bankruptcy Code section 105(a)1, which we’ll refer to 
simply as 105. It allows a bankruptcy court "to issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions"2 of the 
Code. This section derives from the superseded Bankruptcy Act, section 2a(15)3, 
which allowed "courts of bankruptcy" to "make such orders, issue such process, 
and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be 
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of [the] act."4 Section 2a(15) was 
cited dozens of times in reported decisions under the old Bankruptcy Act. Section 
105 of the Bankruptcy Code has been cited in thousands of reported cases as an 
authority to support a wide variety of judicial decisions and actions5.  
Even in the early days of the Code, in 1982, Richard Levine, the first Director and 
Counsel, Executive Office for the United States Trustees, warned that on the basis 
of 105, courts "have begun to develop a concept of almost unlimited power."6 Ten 
years later, in 1992, Chaim Fortgang and Erin Enright, prominent New York 
bankruptcy practitioners, wrote that 105 "has developed into the ‘catchall’ 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code."7 This concept has now fully matured. Today, 
105 is the authority behind an incredibly long list of powers now exercised by 
bankruptcy courts.  
Lawyers now commonly stand on 105 whenever the Code fails clearly to support 
their clients’ position. They often seem to interpret 105 as a boundless source of 
power that enables the bankruptcy judge to make up the law as she goes along 
and, in so doing, to go where no member of Congress has gone before. Some 
judges and lawyers believe that 105 enables a bankruptcy court to hang or 
otherwise fit decisions within the framework of bankruptcy law whether or not the 
bankruptcy statutes accommodate the decisions.  
In this article we discuss the role of 105 in bankruptcy law generally rather than in 
specific bankruptcy cases. We mention a few cases as examples. Mainly, we aim 
at 105. We work toward an understanding of this section that explains our view of 
the bottom issue that determines the proper role and use of 105 and also the 
proper role and use of supplemental law generally. 
Our view of section 105 as a source of supplemental law is different from the 
view reflected by bankruptcy court decisions and actions. We do not believe that 
105 authorizes "supplemental law." Indeed, we think 105 is largely, even 
completely, redundant. We also think that some present uses of 105 are of 
questionable constitutional validity.  
Preliminarily, in order to focus clearly on section 105 and the scope of authority 
the section gives bankruptcy courts, we separate other possible sources of 
authority for bankruptcy courts to supplement the Bankruptcy Code. There are 
three such sources: (1) inherent power, (2) federal common law and (3) equitable 
nature of bankruptcy courts.  
First, all courts have certain, inherent power. This power is real but small and 
limited to process closely related to the conduct of court and functioning process.  
Next, we consider the power of bankruptcy courts to create federal common law. 
We also consider the courts' power on the basis of state law to supplement the 
Bankruptcy Code with principles of common law and equity, especially including 
the principles of traditional equity jurisprudence. These powers exist but are 
tightly, narrowly constrained. We conclude that they are not sources of very wide, 
general authority for applying supplemental law under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Then we consider the legitimacy and meaning of the oft-quoted description of 
bankruptcy courts as "courts of equity." We trace the source and find the meaning 
of this description. It means that apart from state law and as a matter of federal 
law, bankruptcy courts can apply principles of equity jurisprudence. These 
principles are an ancient source of supplemental law, but the principles of equity 
jurisprudence are doctrinally limited by their own terms and are also situationally 
limited by any applicable statute that contradicts or restrains them. Moreover, 
these principles do not include any power simply to do what seems fair, i.e. to "do 
equity." Such a power requires a specific statutory license and even then is 
restrained by legislative purpose and judicial precedent. 
Finally we get to 105 as a basis of wholesale authority for bankruptcy courts to 
supplement the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The end of our search is 
anticlimactic. At most, and depending on whom you believe, 105 merely restates 
the power given elsewhere for bankruptcy courts to issue necessary process and to 
act as courts of equity in applying principles of equity jurisprudence. Section 105 
is not itself a larger or wider or even different source of supplemental law. 
Many cases dispute our conclusion. They apply 105 in many ways that are well 
beyond the limits of equity jurisprudence. These cases make law under 105 as if 
the section were a delegation of lawmaking power by Congress to the courts. This 
interpretation may be supported by good policy, but it is not supported by 
statutory language. Moreover, the Constitution forbids it. Indeed, the practice of 
bankruptcy courts making law in any non-proximately, legislatively guided sense 
is unconstitutional under any congressional grant of supplemental power to the 
courts. It is unconstitutional regardless of the statutory basis of the power and 
whether or not the judicial law fits perfectly within the scope of the delegated 
power. 
II. Inherent Power (Procedural Common Law)  
Federal district courts possess inherent authority to make procedural common law 
for the purpose of protecting "their proceedings and judgments in the course of 
discharging their traditional responsibilities."8 Presumably, bankruptcy courts 
derivatively share this authority. Enforcing compliance with court orders through 
the exercise of the contempt power is an obvious example of a court’s inherent 
power.9 
To a very small extent the courts’ inherent authority is constitutionally protected. 
For the most part, however, this authority can be controlled or overridden by 
Congress. Indeed, even the Supreme Court is constitutionally limited in 
establishing federal rules of procedures. The role of the Court in promulgating 
and maintaining the federal rules is on the basis of a congressional delegation of 
authority in the Rules Enabling Act.10 
The Rules Enabling Act limits the Court to making rules for practice and 
procedure only. Affecting substantive rights is flatly prohibited, and the meaning 
of "substantive rights" for this purpose may be growing.11 Therefore, the courts’ 
statutory authority to make procedural common law is shrinking. Also, the tiny 
inherent authority that the courts possess on their own is even more limited. It is 
not a source of meaningful supplemental law under the Bankruptcy Code.  
III. Making And Applying Substantive Common Law @  
A. As A Matter Of Federal Law @  
Everybody remembers from the first year of law school that there is no 
federal, general, substantive common law, especially not in diversity 
cases. Erie12 and its progeny "so hold." We know this truth from the 
"canned briefs" we bought when we were first-year law students. Federal 
courts, unlike state courts, are not common-law courts13. Federal courts 
"do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of 
decision,"14 because: 
As the general structure of the Constitution and the tenth amendment 
make clear, the framers anticipated that the federal government would 
exercise only specifically enumerated powers. All other powers were 
reserved to the states or the people. The federal judiciary, as a branch of 
the federal government, is also limited by this specific enumeration of 
powers. Thus, any assertion by the judiciary of a general power to make 
law would encroach upon the powers reserved to the states.15 
On the other hand, Erie does not control in matters covered by federal 
statutes. In these matters it is possible, though not certainly clear, that 
federal courts enjoy some little room to make true federal common law.16 
Moreover, federal courts make what we will call interpretative federal 
common law. Here we adopt Professor Field’s rightly wide definition of 
federal common law, which is "any rule of federal law created by a court 
(usually * * * a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly 
suggested by federal enactments -- constitutional or congressional."17 
Making federal common law probably happens most often when federal 
courts interpret federal statutes by adding gloss or inferring a rule after 
finding that the statute permits the addition or inference, either generally 
or with respect to a particular matter or issue.  
Bankruptcy courts are units of the district courts19. Presumably, therefore, 
bankruptcy courts share or derivatively enjoy the district courts’ power of 
making federal common law. This power, which is separate from 105, 
enables bankruptcy courts legitimately to supplement the Code, if only 
interstitially, with substantive law.  
In bankruptcy, however, the federal statutory and incorporated state law 
are very comprehensive, and any constitutional or policy reasons for 
looking to state law for filler are strong. While federal common law can 
sometimes trump otherwise applicable state law when the federal interest 
in doing so is sufficiently strong, the Supreme Court has clearly held that 
state law is not easily trumped by federal common law created by 
bankruptcy judges.20  
Also, the Supreme Court has been equally clear that the Code’s literal 
language must be followed closely so that proper occasion for 
interpretative law is small.21 Very little room is therefore left for making 
federal common law under the Bankruptcy Code. 
In any event, bankruptcy-made federal common law is not the sort of 
supplemental law that concerns us in this presentation. Bankruptcy judges 
create federal common law, whatever the source or reference, under and 
within the bounds of the bankruptcy statute. Our concern is limited to 
judges’ deciding or acting beyond, or different from, statutory provisions 
on the basis of general authority apart from the provisions themselves. 
B. As A Matter Of State Law  
Bankruptcy courts more often create state common law. It happens 
whenever the courts look to state law for substantive rights and liabilities 
of the debtor and other parties. These rights and liabilities are almost 
always governed by state law. In consulting state law for this purpose the 
bankruptcy courts make common law by interpreting applicable state 
statutes or by applying and developing pertinent state common law.  
This state common law is not, however, the true supplemental law that 
interests us. The bankruptcy courts are applying and are constrained by 
specific statutes, or they are projecting common law that is also limited by 
state statutory law and by local precedent. Moreover, in creating state 
common law the bankruptcy courts are adding to state law on which the 
Bankruptcy Code operates rather than to the Code itself.  
Sometimes an applicable state statute empowers courts to use, as a kind of 
supplemental law, state-law principles of common law and equity. The 
best example is Uniform Commercial Code section 1-103,22 which 
provides: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to 
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other 
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.23  
Bankruptcy courts applying local U.C.C. law will rely on 1-103 as 
authority to supplement the statute with principles of common law and 
equity. This process, too, is enabled and constrained by state law and does 
not add supplemental law to the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, the 
Bankruptcy Code can itself displace state law principles of common law 
and equity.24 
IV. Bankruptcy Courts As Courts of Equity  
Separately, bankruptcy courts apply equitable principles to directly affect the 
Bankruptcy Code on the basis of the bankruptcy court’s supposed (though foggy) 
status as a court of equity. Bankruptcy courts are commonly described as being or 
having the powers of "courts of equity."25 Until recently, clear statutory support 
existed for this status. No longer. Today, any such support is, at best, uncertain 
and vague.  
The first federal bankruptcy law, the 1800 Act, gave bankruptcy jurisdiction to the 
district courts. The second law, the 1841 Act, also empowered the district courts 
to exercise this jurisdiction summarily in the nature of summary proceedings in 
equity. The district courts were thereby empowered to effectively act as equity 
courts for purposes of bankruptcy. The Supreme Court made clear that, absent this 
equitable jurisdiction power given by the 1841 Act, "the District Courts of the 
United States possess no equity jurisdiction whatsoever; for the previous 
legislation of Congress conferred no such authority upon them."26  
The district courts’ equity power in bankruptcy matters was explicitly continued 
under the 1867 Act27 and the 1898 Act. The critical language of the 1898 Act was 
the very first part – the introductory part -- of section 2: 
[T]he district courts of the United States * * * are hereby made 
courts of bankruptcy, and are hereby invested * * * with such 
jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise 
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings * * * *. @ 
This language meant that "[a] bankruptcy court is a court of equity, … guided by 
equitable doctrines and principles except in so far as they are inconsistent with the 
[bankruptcy statute]."28 To be a court of equity means "at least * * * that, in the 
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it, it [the bankruptcy court] applies the 
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence."  
More recently, in 1978, Congress enacted section 1481 of Title 28 which provided 
in pertinent part that "[a] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of 
equity." However, when the provisions of title 28 relating to bankruptcy courts 
were amended in 1984 making the bankruptcy court a "unit" of the district court, 
section 1481 was repealed.29 Accordingly, at present, nothing in the Bankruptcy 
Code or related statutes explicitly gives equity jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts 
that is different from or greater than the equity jurisdiction of a federal district 
court.30  
It is generally assumed, however, that, under the Code, bankruptcy courts are 
equity courts31 and can apply equitable principles and rules. Section 105(a) is 
sometimes cited as the basis for this status and power.32  
It is simply not true that 105 is the basis for equity jurisdiction of courts in 
bankruptcy. The legislative history of the section flatly reports that section 105(a) 
is "derived from"33 Bankruptcy Act section 2a(15). Reconsider the language of 
section 2:  
a. The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy are 
hereby created courts of bankruptcy and are hereby invested, within their 
respective territorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter 
changed, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to 
exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act, in vacation, in 
chambers, and during their respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter 
held, to---(15) Make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in 
addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the 
enforcement of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That an injunction 
to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only; make such orders, issue such 
process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as 
may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. (emphasis 
added).34  
The italicized prefatory language in section 2 is the statutory basis for bankruptcy 
courts’ equitable power. Subsection 2a(15) did not itself give equity power to the 
bankruptcy courts. So, section 105, as the modern successor of only subsection 
2a(15), cannot itself give the courts this power.  
The congressional reports behind 105 also explain that "105 is similar in effect to 
the All Writs Statute, * * * under which the new bankruptcy courts are brought 
[separately] by amendment to 28 U.S.C. 451 [which defines the meaning of court 
for purposes of title 28]."35 So, prior to 1984, when bankruptcy courts were 
separate courts, separate legislation brought them under the All Writs Statute.36 
Section 105 was redundant in this respect. Now, of course, the meaning of court 
in section 451 does not directly, explicitly include bankruptcy courts. So, the 
connection between 105 and the All Writs Statute is completely empty. 
We believe that the All Writs Statute still applies to bankruptcy courts, but only 
indirectly or derivatively as units of the federal district courts. Still, the All Writs 
Statute is not a source of equity power or other supplemental law. It is a source of 
process only that must be closely related to fairly clear legislative intent.  
Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts exercise equity power. The putative basis may be 
the doubtful authority of 105; the murky authority of the long-ago merger of law 
and equity in federal courts37; unsubstantiated case authority; or something else or 
nothing whatsoever. The truth is that even without citing authority, bankruptcy 
courts act as courts of equity in the sense of acting as though they are empowered 
to apply equitable principles and rules.  
Equitable principles and rules, however, are not a source of general authority to 
act beyond or different from the Bankruptcy Code. So, even if there is a real and 
lawful basis for bankruptcy judges to assume the role of equity chancellors, this 
role gives them little legitimate reason or room to add substantive, supplemental 
law to the Bankruptcy Code. 
Equity does not empower the judge to create or depart from law in pursuit of 
conscience or morality. It is a subset of principles, rules, and remedies well 
constrained by hundreds of years of precedent that fairly precisely defines equity. 
The important principles of equity were long ago all developed:38  
[E]quity became a system of positive jurisprudence, peculiar 
indeed, and differing from the common law, but founded upon and 
contained in the mass of cases already decided. The Chancellor 
was no longer influenced by his own conscience * * *. [Also,] * * 
* there can be no more capricious enlargement according to the 
will of individual chancellors.39 
Although equitable principles can be adapted to novel conditions, "the broad and 
fruitful principles of equity have been established and cannot be changed by any 
judicial action."40 
Moreover, these concrete principles are only applied to aid law, not to contradict 
law or even add to law. The Supreme Court forcefully made this point in its recent 
decision, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.41, 
holding that the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by the 1789 
Judiciary Act did not empower a court to freeze assets for the benefit of creditors. 
The Court stated: 
We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in 
the federal system, at least, the flexibility is confined within the 
broad boundaries of traditional, equitable relief. To accord a type 
of relief that has never been available before – and especially (as 
here) a type of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by 
longstanding judicial precedent – is to invoke a "default rule," … 
not of flexibility but of omnipotence.42 
Clearly, equitable principles are subordinate and subservient to all law43, 
including statutory law. So, especially when federal courts apply comprehensive 
federal statutes, the use of equity is triggered by, and strictly limited by, the letter 
and clear sense of the statutes. As courts of equity, therefore, bankruptcy courts 
are not empowered to go beyond or depart from the Bankruptcy Code and create 
supplemental law.  
V. Section 105(a)  
Collier and other secondary sources have classified and criticized the cases 
construing section 105.44 Some of these reported decisions seem premised on the 
implicit if not explicit interpretation of section 105 as a direct, fresh, independent 
grant of supplemental power to the bankruptcy courts.45  
Under this broad interpretation, 105(a) does not re-state inherent or equitable 
powers of courts elsewhere provided and otherwise limited. Rather, through 
105(a), Congress separately delegated to bankruptcy courts the authority to act to 
the limits of a wholly independent meaning of 105(a).  
Under this broad meaning, 105(a) could be interpreted as a basis of authority to 
fill in, extend, or retract the Bankruptcy Code in unprovided-for cases and 
unanticipated circumstances in ways that are beyond particular provisions but 
within the largest goals of bankruptcy. We can imagine appealing policy 
arguments that support giving bankruptcy courts such authority. 
We believe that some uses of 105(a) can only be explained by interpreting and 
applying the statute this way. Good examples are partial discharge of student 
loans46, substantive consolidation47, payment of "necessary" unsecured claims 
early in a Chapter 11 case48, and permanently stretching the discharge to protect 
non-debtors.49 
We do not say that these uses are bad bankruptcy policies. We do, however, say 
that such uses raise problems of statutory language and constitutional concepts.  
The problems of statutory language are straight-forward. Section 105 is limited to 
orders that "carry out the provisions of this title." Congress could have used the 
word "policies" or the word "purposes" in section 105. It did not.50 
The problems of constitutional concepts are different and more subtle. The 
constitutional problem is not so much in Congress delegating wide powers to the 
courts through 105(a). The real problem is that in exercising such wide powers, 
the courts are making law to the extent of violating the constitutional separation 
of powers. It makes no difference that Congress may have desperately wanted, 
clearly intended, and explicitly provided for the courts to have such power. 
Congress cannot widen the constitutional limits of judicial power.  
The division of authority between the three branches of the federal government is 
not exact or clear, but is flexible. Their responsibilities can permissibly overlap to 
a point. The overlap is constitutionally too great, that is, the separation of powers 
is offended, when the whole power of one branch is given to and exercised by 
another branch; when excessive authority is accumulated in a single branch; or 
when the authority and independence of one or another coordinate branch is 
undermined.51  
With respect to the judicial branch the special concerns are law that 
"impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch"52 or the 
assignment of "tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches."53 
So, when the Congress delegates certain authority to the courts, the seemingly 
decisive issue in terms of separation of powers is whether the particular authority 
is more properly exercised by another branch.  
It’s a fuzzy scale generally that applies fully to law making. Courts cannot create 
law in the sense of exercising Article I legislative power. On the other hand and at 
the other extreme, applying and interpreting legislation are necessary and 
essential judicial functions. In a sense, applying and interpreting law creates law 
(albeit not "supplemental law"). In sum, the rule is probably that courts cannot 
make law "except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of * * * judicial 
power."54  
In judging the legality of a court’s role under a statute, the separation-of-powers 
issue is whether, on a flexible, fuzzy scale, the role exceeds lawful exercise of 
judicial power under the statute and thus becomes unconstitutional law making. 
We think it depends in large part on the proximity between the court’s 
"legislative" decisions under the statute and the clarity and precision of the 
policies expressed through the statute.  
The issue is whether the court’s decision is necessary to a fairly specific and 
certain statutory intention that drives and guides the judge’s decision making and 
her related actions. It is not enough, for separation of powers, that the court’s 
decision is compatible with relatively undefined or general legislative purposes, 
not even when these general purposes are clearly and forcefully expressed.  
The likelihood of unconstitutional law-making by courts in applying statutes is 
directly related to the distance between the courts’ decisions or actions under the 
statute and a well-defined congressional judgment about the matter behind the 
statute. The farther the stretch, the more likely judicial lawmaking is 
unconstitutional. 
So, the ultimate question about partial discharge and all other judicial 
supplements to the Bankruptcy Code is whether they are too much of a 
legislatively projected reach from the statute to the decision. If so, the 
supplements may violate the Constitution even if they somehow satisfy the 
language of 105(a).  
It’s possible, too, that such supplements are not saved by having roots in 
traditional equity jurisprudence. Remember: we are not completely sure if, why, 
and to which extent bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. We are sure that even 
if they are fully courts of equity, this status gives little reason or room for making 
supplemental law. Also, it is never been entirely clear how far the Constitution 
permits the judicial branch, either on its own or through congressional grant, to 
exercise equitable power, but we cannot imagine that any such authority trumps 
Article I of the Constitution. Courts cannot exercise Article I legislative power 
directly through 105 or any other statute or indirectly through equity. 
VI. Conclusion  
For more than thirty years and in thousands of reported cases, bankruptcy judges 
and lawyers have thought about section 105. They have thought about 105 in 
terms of statutory interpretation, in terms of legislative history, in terms of other 
reported decisions, in terms of bankruptcy policy, in terms of doing equity. We 
recognize that these cases are of real importance and value to the bench and bar, 
which is why we are developing a Web site that collects all of these cases and also 
collects other supplemental law authorities. 
We suggest, however, that from now on, judges and lawyers should also think of 
105 in constitutional terms. We join the call of Professor Robert F. Nagel of the 
University of Colorado Law School who, writing more than 20 years ago about 
the limits of federal courts’ equitable remedies generally, urged: "[l]egal 
commentators and courts should begin the potentially constructive business of 
deciding how separation of powers applies to the scope of equitable relief in 
particular cases."55 
Finally, we suggest that judges and lawyers also think of section 105 in musical 
terms when deciding how the section fits within the whole of the Bankruptcy 
Code. We join the lament of the Oak Ridge Boys in their gospel classic, Rhythm 
Guitar: 
Nobody wants to play rhythm guitar behind Jesus. 
It seems like everybody wants to be the lead singer in the band  
I know it's hard to get a beat on what's divine  
When everybody's pushing toward the head of the line  
I don't think that its working out at all the way He planned.  
We suggest that, musically and constitutionally, section 105 is at most a rhythm 
guitar.56 
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